Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 21

Issue 2

Article 4

3-1-2015

The Devil Is in the Details: The Supreme Court Erodes the Fourth
Amendment in Applying Reasonable Suspicion in Navarette v.

California
George M. Dery III
California State University Fullerton

Kevin Meehan
California State University Fullerton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Human
Rights Law Commons

Recommended Citation
George M. Dery III and Kevin Meehan, The Devil Is in the Details: The Supreme Court Erodes the Fourth
Amendment in Applying Reasonable Suspicion in Navarette v. California, 21 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. &
Soc. Just. 275 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol21/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Devil Is in the Details: The Supreme Court
Erodes the Fourth Amendment in Applying
Reasonable Suspicion in Navarette v. California
George M. Dery III
Kevin Meehan
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .................................................................................. 276
II. The History of Stop and Frisk Based On Informant Tips ............ 277
A. Creation of the Police Power to Stop and Frisk .................... 277
B. Stop and Frisk Cases Involving Police Informants ............... 282
III. Navarette v. California ................................................................ 287
A. The Facts ............................................................................... 287
B. The Court’s Opinion ............................................................. 288
IV. Concerns Created by Navarette’s Reinterpretation of
Reasonable Suspicion .................................................................. 290
A. Navarette Bootstrapped Reasonable Suspicion
out of Nothing More than the Informant’s
Assertions, Undermining the Fourth Amendment
Mandate that Officers Establish Individualized
Suspicion for Fourth Amendment Stops of a Person ............ 290
B. Navarette’s Credulous Approach to Anonymous
Informants Would Have Caused the Court to Find
Reasonable Suspicion in Florida v. J.L.’s Tip ...................... 293

 Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Politics,
Administration, and Justice; Former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D.,
1987, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California; B.A., 1983, University of California Los
Angeles.
 Associate Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Politics,
Administration, and Justice; Former Executive Director, Orange County Youth & Family
Services, Santa Ana, California; Ph.D., School of Social Ecology, University of California,
Irvine, 1994; B.S., Sociology, Virginia Tech, 1972.

275

276

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 275 (2015)
C. Navarette’s Erosion of Reasonable Suspicion
Based on Anonymous Informants Will Encourage
Passive and Lazy Policing .................................................... 296

V. Conclusion ................................................................................... 300
I. Introduction
How much do you trust your fellow drivers? Perhaps you have seen
one drift over a lane line or suddenly swerve while accidentally dropping a
drive-through meal in a lap, having a vehement discussion on a cell phone,
shaving, putting on make-up, or reading a map. How much, for that matter,
can you trust your own driving? Have you experienced any of these
distractions or driven when exhausted after a long workday or in terrible
traffic? Moreover, careless inattention might be the least of your worries.
Road rage has become so common and so deadly that it has captured the
attention of the United States Department of Transportation.1 Do we feel
comfortable empowering these strangers—distracted, frazzled, and angry—
with calling the police and making anonymous accusations that could result
in our suddenly being subjected to a traffic stop?
Whatever doubts you might entertain about deputizing all the drivers
around you, the Court, in Navarette v. California,2 has placed these
motorists, with all of their faults and whims, on the front line of traffic
enforcement. If a driver calls police to claim eyewitness knowledge of a
single instance of “possibly careless or reckless driving”3 by a specific car
in a particular location,4 police are now empowered to pull you over. No
further information is needed, not even the name of the caller.5 Some
motorists, whether to pursue revenge, fight boredom, or carry out a prank,
might find this newfound power—provided without accountability—too
hard to resist.
This is just one of the concerns created by the Court’s reasoning in
Navarette, a case in which the Court reinterpreted the Fourth
1. See JACK STUSTER, AGGRESSIVE DRIVING ENFORCEMENT: EVALUATION OF TWO
DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAMS
(2004),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/
research/AggDrivingEnf/pages/introduction.html (reporting the increase of aggressive driving
cases since the 1990s and the contributing factors to such behavior).
2. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
3. Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 1689.
5. Id. at 1688–89.
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Amendment’s6 requirement that police possess “reasonable suspicion”
before performing a traffic stop.7 In basing the lawfulness of its stop on an
anonymous tip, Navarette eroded reasonable suspicion, relying on little
more than bootstrapping from an informant’s own assertions. Such
credulous acceptance of anonymous accusations should now prompt a
reassessment of the facts in an earlier anonymous informant case, Florida v.
J.L.,8 for Navarette’s new approach could have resulted in finding
reasonable suspicion even with J.L.’s troubling circumstances. Finally,
Navarette’s diluted reasonable suspicion standard could encourage passive
and sloppy policing, for officers will be tempted to rely on easily acquired
anonymous tips rather than engage in arduous collection of evidence.
These concerns will be addressed in this Article. This work begins, in
Part II, with a review of the history of stop and frisk rulings based on
informant’s tips. Part III presents Navarette by examining its facts and the
Court’s opinion. Finally, Part IV critically examines the worrying
implications of Navarette’s reasoning.
II. The History of Stop and Frisk Based On Informant Tips
A. Creation of the Police Power to Stop and Frisk
The changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine that supported field
detentions first occurred in a home rather than on the street and involved a
search instead of a seizure. This shift occurred in Camara v. Municipal
Court, a case in which a homeowner was convicted for refusing warrantless
entry to a city health inspector.9 Rejecting the argument that such routine
inspections implicated only “peripheral” Fourth Amendment interests,10
Camara found instead that the “practical effect of this system is to leave the

6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Id.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
529 U.S. 266 (2000).
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967).
See id. at 530.
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occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field.”11 The Court
therefore held that these “administrative searches” must be supported by a
warrant.12
Having marched up the hill to establish a warrant requirement for
health inspections, the Camara Court spent the rest of its opinion making
tactical retreats in the face of the practical problems involved in applying a
warrant mandate to routine inspections.13 Camara acknowledged that health
inspections were fundamentally different from “typical Fourth Amendment
cases”14 because the “only effective way to seek universal compliance”
with city codes was through “routine periodic inspections of all structures,”
regardless of individualized suspicion in any particular dwelling.15 The
Court therefore cast about for an “accommodation between public need and
individual rights.”16 Instead of adhering to the traditional standard that an
inspector must possess probable cause “that a particular dwelling contains
violations,”17 Camara recast probable cause as an inquiry into
reasonableness. For these new warrants, the Court transformed probable
cause into the following balancing test: “In determining whether a
particular inspection is reasonable—and thus in determining whether there
is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection—the need for the
inspection must be weighed in terms of (the) reasonable goals of code
enforcement.”18
Thus, Camara found that a routine health inspection of a home
implicated interests so central to Fourth Amendment privacy that such a
search needed to be restrained by a warrant.19 The warrant providing the
protection, however, was a pale reflection of the warrant mandated in
11. Id. at 532.
12. See id. at 534.
13. Camara was alert to the problems it faced in imposing the warrant requirement on
health inspectors, for it warned that “translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines for the decision of particular
cases is a difficult task.” Id. at 528.
14. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). The Court noted the
“unique character of these inspection programs.” Id.
15. Id. at 535–36. Camara further explained that the aim of code inspections was to
secure “city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards” in order to “prevent even
the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and
safety.” Id. at 535.
16. Id. at 534.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 535.
19. Id. at 540.
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criminal investigations, for its probable cause had been diluted to a vague
balancing of interests. The Court’s new kind of probable cause had little
textual basis, for the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for
particularly described places, persons, or things.20 Camara sensed the
weakness of its new probable cause standard, offering the excuse that,
“Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails.”21 Further, the Court explicitly recognized the criticism that
its “synthetic search warrant” would “lessen the overall protections of the
Fourth Amendment.”22
This worry came to partial fruition in Terry v. Ohio,23 where a police
officer with 39 years’ experience stopped and frisked men he suspected of
“casing a job, a stick up.”24 In Terry, the Court created the right of police to
stop25 and frisk26 a suspect on less than probable cause.27 Even when
dispensing with probable cause, Terry still mandated that police act on
individualized suspicion; to stop and frisk, the officer needed “specific and

20. U.S. CONST, amend. IV (“[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”).
21. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967).
22. Id. at 538.
23. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that a pat down search by a
police officer is reasonable where the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person
stopped is armed and dangerous, regardless of whether the officer has probable cause to
arrest that individual). In assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct in its own
case, Terry cited Camara in noting “there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search
[or seizure] entails.’” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21For a full analysis of Terry’s expansion upon
Camara, see Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief
of Camara and Terry 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 396 (1988), in which the author contended,
“Because the (Terry) Court had not previously relied upon reasonableness as an independent
fourth amendment factor, it did not have a reasonableness test to utilize. As a result, the
Court turned to its closest example of a reasonableness balancing test -- the Camara
definition of probable cause.”
24. Id. at 5.
25. See id. at 21–23 (stating that an intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of a citizen is justified if specific facts and inferences from those facts reasonably
warrant that intrusion).
26. Id. at 30.
27. The Terry Court criticized the contention that police could not act until “there is
probable cause to make an arrest,” because “a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger
may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a
person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime.” Id. at 25–27.
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articulable facts which, taken with rational inferences from those facts,”28
caused the officer to “reasonably conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity is afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous.”29
This level of certainty, later termed “reasonable suspicion,”30 lacked
any textual basis in the Fourth Amendment, in which the founders mention
only “probable cause.”31 Indeed, the Court itself had previously ruled that
probable cause was the “best compromise that has been found to
accommodat(e) . . . often opposing interests,”32 and lauded this Fourth
Amendment standard for protecting “both the officer and the citizen.”33 In
his dissent, Justice Douglas noted that the Court, in creating the right of
stop and frisk on less than probable cause, had provided police with powers
denied to judges. He reasoned:
Had a warrant been sought, a magistrate would . . . have been
unauthorized to issue one, he can act only if there is a showing of
“probable cause.” We hold today that the police have greater authority
to make a “seizure” and conduct a “search” than a judge has to authorize
such action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again.34

Defending its innovation, Terry cited Camara’s lament that there was “no
ready test for determining reasonableness” other than in balancing the
competing interests of a case.35
Alert to the door it was opening to more searches and seizures, Terry
took great care in reaching its conclusion. The Court candidly
acknowledged that the case presented “serious questions”36 which thrust “to
the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police
activity.”37 The concerns of officers patrolling streets, where “the answer to
the police officer may be a bullet,” had to be weighed against those of the
28. Id. at 21.
29. Id. at 30.
30. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91(1964) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176 (1949)).
33. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 21. Terry again sought support from Camara in applying the Fourth
Amendment to official action falling outside the typical norm of custodial arrest. See id. at
27.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 9.
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individual, whose right to possess and control “his own person” was
“sacred” and “carefully guarded by the common law.”38 The Court
considered the case with humility, “mindful of the limitations of the judicial
function in controlling the myriad daily situations in which policemen and
citizens confront each other on the street.”39 Terry was aware of the
institutional constraints on its ability to affect police in the field, even
conceding it was “powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally
guaranteed rights” if officers were “willing to forgo successful prosecution
in the interest of serving some other goal.”40
However daunting it might be to limit a rule lacking textual anchors,
Terry attempted to place a series of constraints on police stop and frisks.
The Court approved only “restrained investigative conduct” that was based
on “ample factual justification.”41 Terry insisted on assessing police
reasonableness at two stages to ensure that (1) “the officer’s action was
justified at its inception,” and (2) that “it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”42 To
justify the seizure in the first place, Terry mandated that an officer “point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”43 The Court rejected
police reliance on hunches or good faith, finding it “imperative” that
official conduct be measured by “an objective standard.”44 While Terry
allowed police to perform the stop and frisk without prior judicial approval,
it expected the official intrusion to be subjected to rigorous examination by
a judicial official after the fact, for, “[t]he scheme of the Fourth
Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point
the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.”45
38. Id. (noting “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.”).
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id. at 14.
41. Id. at 15.
42. Id. at 19–20.
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id. at 21–22.
45. Id. at 21. Moreover, the Court still expected police to pursue a warrant “whenever
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The additional intrusion involved in a frisk required reasonable
suspicion not just of criminality, but of peril—the suspicion had to point to
the suspect being “armed and presently dangerous.”46 Even this suspicion
only enabled a “carefully limited search” of “outer clothing” for “weapons
which might be used to assault” the officer.47 Thus, reaching into pockets or
under waistbands and seeking drugs or other evidence of criminality were
beyond the scope of Terry’s reach.
B. Stop and Frisk Cases Involving Police Informants
In Terry, Detective McFadden, the officer who performed the first stop
and frisk officially sanctioned by the Court, based his reasonable suspicion
entirely on his own observations.48 Some later stop and frisk cases would
lack this luxury. In Adams v. Williams, an officer performed a stop and frisk
based on a tip given by an informant who visited his patrol car in a high
crime area at 2:15 a.m.49 Acting on the tipster’s information that “an
individual seated in a nearby vehicle” possessed narcotics and a gun, the
officer approached the car and ultimately reached through the driver’s
window to recover the weapon from the occupant’s waistband.50
The Court in Adams rejected the argument that reasonable suspicion
could only be based on an officer’s personal observations, instead allowing
officers to base a stop and frisk on any tip possessing “enough indicia of
reliability.”51 The tip in Adams had indicators that proved its reliability.52
The officer personally knew the informant, having received information
from him in the past. 53 The informant potentially exposed himself to
immediate arrest for making a false complaint, for the officer could quickly
test the truth of his assertions by walking over to the nearby car.54 The
practicable.” Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 5–7.
49. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144–45 (1972).
50. Id. Sergeant Connolly, the officer in Adams, first merely walked up to the vehicle,
tapped on the car window, and requested the occupant to open the door. Id. at 145. Only
when the driver instead rolled down the window did the officer reach in to collect the gun.
Id.
51. Id. at 147.
52. Id. at 146–47.
53. Id. at 146.
54. Id. at 146–47.

THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

283

Adams Court even noted that the personal presence of a known informant
made it “a stronger case than obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone
tip.”55
Anonymous telephone tips went from hypothetical to reality in
Alabama v. White,56 in which an unknown person provided a detailed tip
that a Vanessa White could be found in possession of cocaine while driving
a station wagon to a motel.57 White considered anonymous tips in light of
Illinois v. Gates’ fundamental changes to probable cause analysis.58 In
Gates, a case also involving an anonymous tip, the Court criticized an
earlier test59 for probable cause as being so “elaborate”60 and “rigid”61 that it
would better fit “legal technicians”62 or scholars in libraries63 than
laypersons hurrying to fill out warrant affidavits.64 Gates instead
championed a “totality-of-the-circumstances approach,” which had the
virtue of presenting a “practical, nontechnical conception” of probable
cause.65
While Gates still considered the two elements of the old test—the
informant’s veracity and the informant’s basis of knowledge—such factors
no longer had to be rigidly established separately and independently from
each other.66 Under Gates’ new test, when assessing all the facts—the
“totality of the circumstances”—for probable cause, a deficiency in one of
the two prongs “may be compensated for, in determining the overall
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some of the
indicia of reliability.”67 Thus, if a person has established an unusually
consistent track record in predicting certain kinds of criminal activities in a
55. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
56. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
57. Id. at 327.
58. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
59. Id. at 229. The earlier “two-pronged” test was formed in light of Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 231.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 232.
64. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
65. Id. at 230–31 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). The
Gates Court believed its new test considered human behavior in a common-sense fashion.
Id. at 231 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
66. Id. at 230.
67. Id. at 233 (referencing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) and
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) as exemplary cases).
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location, this veracity and reliability can compensate for a tipster’s failure
to explain his basis of knowledge. Likewise, if an informant provides a
strong foundation for his basis of knowledge (i.e., “I saw the crime,” or “I
participated in the sale”), then this inside information can compensate for a
failure to otherwise establish truthfulness and reliability.
The White Court applied a modified version of the Gates standard to
decide whether its anonymous telephone tip “exhibited sufficient indicia of
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.”68
While White employed a “totality of the circumstances” analysis,69 it
applied this test to the “reasonable suspicion standard” instead of probable
cause.70 The “less demanding standard” of reasonable suspicion could be
met not only with “information that is different in quantity or content” than
that needed for probable cause, but also with information that is “less
reliable than that required to show probable cause.”71
White then focused on the anonymous informant in its case, noting that
such a person’s tip, “alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of
knowledge or veracity.”72 An anonymous tip, however, could be bolstered
by other information.73 In its own facts, White found that “there is more
than the tip itself” to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.74 The
informant provided a series of details that, while not as extensive as the
informant in Gates, did establish a series of facts for police follow up.75
White’s anonymous caller provided a time for White’s departure, specified
the building from which she would leave, identified the color, make, model,
and condition (“broken right taillight”) of the vehicle she would drive and
the direction in which she would drive it.76 While not verifying every detail,

68. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 326 (1990).
69. Id. at 332.
70. Id. at 328–29.
71. Id. at 330.
72. See id. at 329 (following the opinion in Gates, which noted, “the veracity of
persons supplying anonymous tips is ‘by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable."
Gates, 462 U.S. at 237. White followed Gates due to the factual similarity of the anonymous
tips in both cases).
73. See id. (refusing to say that an anonymous tip “could never provide reasonable
suspicion”).
74. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 327.
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police “significantly” corroborated many of them.77 The officers in White
thus bolstered the reliability of the tip through “independent police work.”78
The White Court was particularly impressed with the tipster’s ability to
predict the suspect’s future conduct.79 The Court declared, “We think it also
important that, as in Gates, ‘the anonymous [tip] contained a range of
details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at
the time of the tip, but to future action of third parties ordinarily not easily
predicted.’”80 The ability to foretell future behavior was especially
important because “it demonstrated inside information—a special
familiarity with [White’s] affairs.”81 Specifically, “[t]he general public
would have had no way of knowing” that White would leave a particular
building at a certain time, get into a particular vehicle, and drive in a
particular direction.82 Because “only a small number of people are generally
privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a
person with access to such information is likely to have access to reliable
information about that individual’s illegal activities.”83 White even
contrasted these predictions with an easily “predicted” fact that anyone
could have offered the police—that the officers could find “a car precisely
matching the caller’s description in front of [White’s] building.”84 While it
could be said that such a tip predicted the future—when police later check
in front of the building they could see the car parked there—it was a
prediction anyone driving by could hazard about any car parked at a
residence, and therefore lacked the insider’s knowledge of future
behavior.85 Thus, when White expanded the basis for a stop and frisk to
include information from anonymous tips,86 it took care to note that the tip
alone would rarely suffice and that the most reliable informants could
foresee the future behavior of their subjects.87

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 326, 331.
Id. at 330.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331–32 (1990).
Id. at 332 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245).
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 329.
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The Court’s next anonymous tip case, Florida v. J.L.,88 failed to meet
White’s standards for reasonable suspicion.89 In J.L., an anonymous caller
told Miami-Dade police that, “a young black male standing at a particular
bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”90 Police arrived six
minutes later to find three black males, one of which was wearing a plaid
shirt, “just hanging out.”91 Officers approached and searched J.L., who was
wearing the plaid shirt, and found a gun in his pocket.92 Summing up these
facts, the Court stated the issue simply as “whether an anonymous tip that a
person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police
officer’s stop and frisk of that person.”93
J.L. concluded that its anonymous tip lacked the necessary indicia of
reliability, for beyond the caller’s bald assertions, “no predictive
information” was offered to enable police to test the informant’s knowledge
or credibility.94 While the tipster did accurately describe “the suspect’s
visible attributes” and his “particular location,” such predictions about a
person’s dress at a specified place did not provide “any basis for believing
he had inside information about J.L.”95 Instead, anyone driving by the bus
stop—a “readily observable location”—where J.L. was “hanging out” could
have informed police about his appearance, clothing, and location.96 The tip
was only credible in its identification of a particular person, not in
establishing the “likelihood of criminal activity, which is central in
anonymous-tip cases.”97 Thus, the Court’s last word on anonymous tips
before Navarette explicitly forbad reliance on bare assertions of criminal
activity from anonymous tipsters who could offer nothing beyond a
description of a person’s appearance and place.

88. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
89. Id. at 274.
90. Id. at 268.
91. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993)).
92. Id. at 268.
93. Id.
94. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 271 (2000).
95. Id.
96. Id.at 268, 271–72.
97. Id. at 272 (citing 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(h), at 213 (3d
ed.1996)).
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III. Navarette v. California
A. The Facts
On August 23, 2008, Matia Moore and Sharon Odbert, a Mendocino
County 911 California Highway Patrol (CHP) dispatch team, received a call
from their Humboldt County counterpart that “she had received a 911 call
from a citizen who reported being run off the road by a reckless driver.” 98
The Humboldt dispatcher’s report showed up on Sharon Odbert’s computer
as follows: “Showing southbound Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver
Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David-94925. Ran the reporting party off the
roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.”99 When the
Mendocino County dispatchers broadcast this information at 3:47 p.m., two
CHP officers, Officer Williams and Sergeant Francis, separately responded
to the call by heading northbound to the location.100 At 4:00 p.m., Sergeant
Francis “advised dispatch that he had passed the truck, which was going in
the opposite direction, just south of mile marker 69, approximately 19 miles
south of the last sighting.”101 Five minutes later, after having made a Uturn, Sergeant Francis pulled the truck, driven by Lorenzo Navarette,
over.102 After hearing that Sergeant Francis had seen the vehicle, Officer
Williams saw his fellow officer following the truck at mile marker 66.103
Officer Williams made his own U-turn and eventually pulled up behind
Sergeant Francis.104 “There was no evidence that either officer had seen any
erratic driving while following the truck.”105 As the officers approached the
truck,106 they smelled marijuana, leading them to search the vehicle and

98. Brief for Respondent at 1, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 129490) [hereinafter Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent].
99. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686–87 (2014); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorari. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490), at 3 [hereinafter Petition].
100. Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent at 4.
101. Id.
102. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
103. Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent at 4.
104. Id.
105. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner at 5.
106. Id. (noting that the vehicle had a “camper shell with darkened windows” through
which officers could not see).
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recover 30 pounds of marijuana.107 Police arrested Navarette and his
passenger, Jose Prado Navarette.108
B. The Court’s Opinion
The issue presented in Navarette was whether a report from an
anonymous 911 caller stating that a truck ran her off the roadway was
sufficient, under the totality of the circumstances, to establish the
reasonable suspicion needed for a stop.109 The Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Thomas, recognized that such stops required an officer to possess
“a particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity.110
Navarette, however, emphasized that the level of suspicion needed was
“‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.”111
Navarette candidly acknowledged that an anonymous tip “alone
seldom” provides a sound basis for reasonable suspicion because such a
tipster is “by hypothesis largely unknown and unknowable.”112 The Court,
however, noted that White accepted an anonymous tip when its officers
confirmed some of the informant’s “innocent details” because “an
informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely to
tell the truth about other things.”113 Navarette further declared that J.L.’s
anonymous “bare-bones tip” failed to establish reasonable suspicion
because the “tipster did not explain how he knew about the gun, nor did he
suggest that he had any special familiarity with the young man’s affairs.”114
Moreover, J.L.’s tip “included no predictions of future behavior” that police
could corroborate to test the informant’s credibility.115
When it turned to the facts in Navarette, the Court concluded, “the call
bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s
107. Id. at 4 (noting that the marijuana was found in “four large, closed bags” in the bed
of the truck, along with clippers and fertilizer).
108. Id.
109. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014) (noting that the criminal
activity suspected was “that the driver was intoxicated”).
110. Id. at 1685 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981).
111. Id. at 1687 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
112. Id. at 1688 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (emphasis
added)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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account.”116 Navarette’s anonymous caller reported that “she had been run
off the road by a specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate
8D94925,” and therefore claimed “eyewitness knowledge of the alleged
dangerous driving.”117 The Court determined that the naming of a particular
vehicle at a certain location committing a specific act provided the “basis of
knowledge” supporting the tip’s reliability.118 The anonymous caller’s
veracity was bolstered by the officers’ observation of the truck at mile
marker 69, which fell within a timeline that coincided with the tipster’s
report.119 Not only did the location of the vehicle fit within the caller’s
narrative, it also suggested “the caller reported the incident soon after she
was run off the road.”120 The Court believed the closeness in time between
the claimed traffic incident and the 911 call made the tip akin to the hearsay
exceptions “present sense impression” and “excited utterance,” and thus
“especially reliable.”121 Navarette also determined that use of the 911
system itself indicated the caller’s veracity, because the emergency system
possessed “some safeguards” against making false reports, such as the
chance that a call might be recorded, the passage of laws criminalizing false
reports, and the creation of regulations requiring identification of a “caller’s
geographic location with increasing specificity.”122 These features, even if
partial, could cause a reasonable officer to “conclude that a false tipster
would think twice before using the system.”123 Cobbling together all of
these facts, Navarette concluded, “the indicia of reliability in this case
[was] sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the
driver of the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road.”124
Forming reasonable suspicion of “an isolated episode of past
recklessness,” however, did not satisfy the Navarette Court, for it deemed
an investigative stop required reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity
may be afoot.”125 The 911 caller fulfilled this requirement by alleging
behavior that indicated an “ongoing crime” of “drunk driving.”126 Common
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014).
Id. at 1689.
Id. at 1686.
Id. at 1687.
Id. at 1689.
Id.
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689–90 (2014).
Id. at 1690.
Id. at 1692
Id. at 1690 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
Id. at 1693.
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sense dictated that “certain driving behaviors,” such as crossing the center
line or weaving back and forth “are strongly correlated with drunk
driving.”127 The even more extreme driving of “running another car off the
highway . . . . bears too great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations
of drunk driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness.”128
Interestingly, “the absence of additional suspicious conduct, after the
vehicle was first spotted by an officer” did not dispel reasonable suspicion
of drunk driving, because the driver’s awareness of the officer’s presence
“would inspire more careful driving for a time.”129 Therefore, the
anonymous tip was reliable and the accusation involved an ongoing
offense.130 This reasoning thus ultimately led Navarette to decide that, even
though the facts presented a “close case,” it was reasonable for the police to
make the stop.131
IV. Concerns Created by Navarette’s Reinterpretation of Reasonable
Suspicion
A. Navarette Bootstrapped Reasonable Suspicion out of Nothing More than
the Informant’s Assertions, Undermining the Fourth Amendment Mandate
that Officers Establish Individualized Suspicion for Fourth Amendment
Stops of a Person
In assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed to stop a truck for
drunk driving, Navarette offered arguments that amounted to little more
than bootstrapping. The Court ultimately found its anonymous informant to
be credible and reliable essentially because the tipster claimed to be so.
Navarette determined that the informant’s role as an “eyewitness” lent
“significant support to the tip’s reliability.”132 The source advising the
Court that the informant was an “eyewitness,” however, was the tipster
herself.133 Navarette relied on Illinois v. Gates to note that an informant’s
“explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a
127. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690–91 (2014).
128. Id. at 1691.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1692 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)).
132. Id. at 1689.
133. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting “the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge”).
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statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles [the] tip to greater
weight.”134 Yet, here, the event reported—being “run off the road” 135—was
one that was so brief that it offered few details that could be independently
verified by police, and so remained untested. This contrasted sharply with
the details that could be tested in Gates, which involved a multistate
marijuana operation that unfolded over at least a few days. Navarette also
relied on Spinelli v. United States’ language favoring an informant’s
personal observations, even though Spinelli involved an established
bookmaking operation, rather than an event that occurred within seconds.136
While both Gates and Spinelli involved probable cause rather than
reasonable suspicion, the fact remains that the only testable details
Navarette’s tipster could offer involved identification of the vehicle, which
was “generally available knowledge” to “everyone in the world who saw
the car.”137 The Court also believed that “a driver’s claim that another
vehicle ran her off the road . . . necessarily implies that the informant
knows the other car was driven dangerously.”138 The personal knowledge
Navarette clings to is once again on the shakiest of foundations—an
untestable assertion by an anonymous tipster. Navarette declared that the
informant gave information consistent with the truck’s location when found
by police, giving “reason to think” she was “telling the truth.”139 Many
fellow motorists could have offered this same information, doing nothing
more impressive than reporting that the truck “would be heading south on
Highway 1.”140 Navarette’s circular reasoning cannot bear close scrutiny.
The Court determined that the informant could be trusted as reliable
because she told police she had personal knowledge of details because she
was an eyewitness; the truth about her claims of being an eyewitness with
personal knowledge could be believed because the Court assumed these
claims to be credible.
Even if the informant saw “a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate
8D94925” driving at a particular location on the highway, this information
did not have the weight Navarette gave it in assessing reasonable

134.
(1983)).
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1689 (majority opinion) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234
Id.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1689 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1693 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
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suspicion.141 The 911 caller’s tip lacked the predictions that gave the
anonymous informant in White credibility.142 The White Court distinguished
between two kinds of predictions.143 The first kind of prediction merely
related to “easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the
tip,” such as the prediction that officers would find “a car precisely
matching the caller’s description in front of the 235 building.”144 This first
kind of prediction did not impress White because “[a]nyone could have
‘predicted’ that fact because it was a condition presumably existing at the
time of the call.”145 In contrast, the second kind of prediction which foretold
“future actions of third parties” impressed White because the ability to
predict a suspect’s future behavior “demonstrated inside information” and a
“special familiarity” with the suspect’s affairs to which the general public
would have no access.146 Navarette’s emphasis on its informant’s ability to
identify a specific car, down to its license plate, and its location, at a
particular mile marker147 contrasts jarringly with White’s demotion of such
predictions to something “anyone” could know.148 Navarette’s misplaced
confidence in the informant’s predictive abilities demonstrates the Court’s
inability to currently distinguish between White’s two kinds of predictions.
Navarette accepted at face value the assertions of a tipster—a person
about whom the only things it knew for certain were her gender and her
ability to operate a car and a phone—that she had personal knowledge as an
eyewitness of a commission of a crime. The Court then strained to use these
untested and untestable accusations to label an anonymous informant as
credible. In doing so, Navarette accepted a new kind of predictive tip as
establishing credibility, a prediction based on easily obtained facts
generally available to the public, including those motorists driving with the
tipster on Highway 1. Such a lenient look at an anonymous informant’s

141. Id. at 1689 (majority opinion).
142. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (noting that “the independent
corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informant’s predictions imparted
some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.”).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that “the Court makes a big deal of the fact that the tipster was dead right about the
fact that a silver Ford F-150 truck (license plate 8D94925) was travelling south on Highway
1 somewhere near mile marker 88.”).
148. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
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contentions undermines the rigor of the Court’s reasonable suspicion
analysis.
B. Navarette’s Credulous Approach to Anonymous Informants Would Have
Caused the Court to Find Reasonable Suspicion in Florida v. J.L.’s Tip
In J.L., the United States proposed a stop-and-frisk should be found
reasonable whenever three criteria were met: “(1) an anonymous tip
provides a description of a particular person at a particular location illegally
carrying a concealed firearm, (2) police promptly verify the pertinent
details of the tip except the existence of the firearm, and (3) there are no
factors that cast doubt on the reliability of the tip.”149 The Court dismissed
such a test as misunderstanding “the reliability needed for a tip to justify a
Terry stop.”150 In light of Navarette’s reasoning, however, today’s Court
would be quite open to the three-pronged reliability test the United States
offered in J.L. In fact, a review of the factual analysis in Navarette compels
the question of whether J.L. would be decided differently had it been
brought before the Navarette Court.
Navarette has largely adopted the three-part test the United States
presented in J.L. Navarette applied a version of the first part of the rejected
J.L. test—that the tip provide “a description of a particular person at a
particular location illegally carrying a concealed firearm,”151 when it
deemed its informant’s reliability bolstered by her identification of “a
specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 8D94925.”152
While Navarette emphasized the accurate description of a particular
suspected car,153 J.L.’s rejected test focused on the accurate description of a
suspected person.154 Further, the importance Navarette placed in the
informant’s ability to identify the proper location of the suspected car 155
149. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000). The United States argued as amicus
curiae in the case.
150. Id. at 272.
151. Id. at 271.
152. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
153. See id. (“By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific
vehicle . . . the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous
driving.”).
154. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (holding that an accurate description of a subject is
reliable but does not show that the informant has knowledge of concealed criminal activity).
155. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (2014) (relating the informant’s
contemporaneous report to the hearsay exception for “excited utterances”).
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echoes the approval given to an informant’s proper identification of the
location of a suspected person in the test rejected in J.L. Navarette also
applied a version of the second part of the rejected J.L. test—that the
“police promptly verify the pertinent details of the tip except the existence
of the firearm.”156 Again, Navarette was pleased by the officer’s
verification of the car’s appearance and location while not being troubled
by the officer’s failure to see any bad driving (here analogous to J.L’s
officers not being able to confirm concealed weapon possession).157 Finally,
as if applying the third part of the rejected J.L. test—“there are no factors
that cast doubt on the reliability of the tip,”158 Navarette felt compelled to
offer several reasons for dismissing the officer’s failure to find erratic
driving. The Court speculated that, “the appearance of a marked police car
would inspire more careful driving for a time.”159 This statement borders on
the bizarre, as noted by Justice Scalia’s quip that “Whether a drunk driver
drives drunkenly, the Court seems to think, is up to him.”160 Next, in a
statement that could cast doubt on officer testimony in thousands of driving
under the influence cases, Navarette, in attempting to discount the driver’s
failure to betray his intoxication, actually claimed that five minutes of
observation was “hardly” sufficient to assess driving behavior.161 Again,
Justice Scalia disagreed heartily, declaring, “Five minutes is a long time.”162
In its final attempt to explain away the legal significance of police
observing only proper driving, Navarette offered the following assertion:
“an officer who already has such a reasonable suspicion need not surveil a
vehicle at length in order to personally observe suspicious driving.”163
While true in the sense that an officer need not gain further information to
justify a stop once he or she has obtained reasonable suspicion, Navarette’s
statement fails to address the problem which occurs when an officer does
perform further surveillance and these observations undermine the initial
determination of reasonable suspicion. What if the officer comes across a
reported vehicle and learns that the driver was a “volunteer fireman”
driving to a fire, a “physician rushing to the hospital or someone who jerked

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 271 (2000).
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689, 1691.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1691.
Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1691.
Id. at 1696.
Id. at 1691.
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from one lane to another due to a “bee in the car or a crying baby.”164 What
if the officer followed the driver and found no erratic driving for 30
minutes, an hour, three hours? Could police ignore these facts in order to
maintain their grasp on previously formed reasonable suspicion? The force
of Navarette’s logic flies in the face of a lesson repeatedly emphasized in
Terry precedent: officers are expected to continue assessing information
even after they have obtained reasonable suspicion to believe criminality
exits.165 For police must be able to respond to evolving street encounters.166
Adams defended Terry stops as the “essence of good police work” because,
“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information,
may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the
time.”167 The Court again assumed that good police work included an
officer gathering and assessing additional information after obtaining
reasonable suspicion in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.168 In this case, the
Court held:
when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a
particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he
may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion . . . . The officer may question the driver and passengers about
their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain
suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be
based on consent or probable cause. 169

In neither Adams nor Brignoni-Ponce did the Court suggest that the officer
could turn a blind eye to exculpatory evidence in order to preserve the
reasonable suspicion initially formed.

164. AAA FOUNDATION FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, 2 ROAD RAGE: HOW TO AVOID
AGGRESSIVE DRIVING, https://www.aaafoundation.org/sites/default/files/RoadRageBrochure.
pdf. (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
165. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–46 (1972) (recognizing that in Terry,
the Court found the officer may make a brief stop of a suspicious individual to obtain more
information).
166. See Terry v. Evans, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (describing police conduct as
“necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat.”).
167. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–46 (1972).
168. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–82 (1975) (holding that a
brief stop by an officer to obtain more information from suspicious individuals was
reasonable).
169. Id. at 881.
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When J.L. is analyzed by the totality of circumstances approach, in the
manner now applied in Navarette, the tipster would in all likelihood be
found reliable. In J.L., the tipster noted that the suspected juvenile was
“wearing a plaid shirt,”170 a fact analogous to the make and model of the car
that so impressed Navarette.171 J.L.’s informant placed the suspect at “a
particular bus stop”172 while Navarette’s could only locate him within
measurements of mile markers.173 J.L.’s anonymous caller gave his tip to
police officers174 likely trained in identifying voices and presumably able to
arrest those who offered them false information while Navarette’s 911
caller impressed the Court by operating under similar constraints.175 The
fact that police observed J.L. make “no threatening or otherwise unusual
movements”176 would be meaningless because according to Navarette, “an
officer who already has such a reasonable suspicion need not surveil” the
suspect in order to “personally observe” the criminal activity.177 Through
Navarette’s lens, the facts in J.L., as weak as they were, would receive a
much more generous viewing. Thus, Navarette’s new application of the
reasonable suspicion standard could open the way to expansion of police
power, allowing Terry stops in facts quite similar to those in J.L.
C. Navarette’s Erosion of Reasonable Suspicion Based on Anonymous
Informants Will Encourage Passive and Lazy Policing
Navarette will have a negative impact on police professionalism. The
Court has long understood the direct link between its rulings and police
conduct in the field. In New York v. Belton, which defined the scope of
search incident to arrest for drivers stopped on the road, the Court took care

170. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
171. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (2014).
172. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
173. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
174. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
175. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689–90. The Navarette Court noted that its anonymous
caller was not free to lie with impunity, for “A 911 call has some features that allow for
identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false
reports with immunity.” Id. at 1689. Navarette therefore declared, “a reasonable officer
could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system.” Id. at
1690.
176. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
177. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1691.
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to consider how to craft a workable rule for officers.178 Belton noted, “the
protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments ‘can only be realized
if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes
it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an
invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.’” 179
Belton recognized that the Fourth Amendment was “intended to regulate the
police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms
that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law
enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged.”180 Similarly,
when the Gates Court formulated its probable cause test, it was aware that
the rule would usually be applied by “nonlawyers in the midst of haste.”181
Such “practical people” as “law enforcement officers” are not “legal
technicians.”182
Rules seemingly aiding police by vesting them with powers can lead to
laxity and sloppy police work. For example, in the confessions context, the
Court once ruled that the Fifth Amendment183 did not apply to state law
enforcement.184 Some police abused this lack of accountability when

178. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (“[A] single familiar standard is
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront.”) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979)).
179. Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" versus
"Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. CT. REV. 127, 142 (1974)).
180. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV.).
181. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (“[A]ffidavits are normally drafted by
nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.”).
182. Id. at 231–32. Justice Scalia put it even more directly, declaring, “Law
enforcement agencies follow closely our judgments on matters such as this.” Navarette v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), the Court held, “The exemption
from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of National citizenship
guaranteed by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.”
Id. at 99.
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seeking confessions.185 Later, the Court lamented, “history amply shows
that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials
the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence.”186 The
Court in Escobedo v. Illinois noted:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system
of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession"
will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a
system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation. As Dean Wigmore so wisely said:
"Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust
habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself
suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon
such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of
the other sources.187

Navarette, in lowering the bar for establishing reasonable suspicion
based on anonymous tips, could encourage officers to increasingly rely on
such grounds instead of performing the labor-intensive task of
independently building a case for such a stop. In particular, the ease of
basing a stop on one tip could cause police to stop pursuing the “patient
skills” once honed over months-long investigations of the kind that
occurred in United States v. Cortez.188 In Cortez, Border Patrol officers in
Arizona painstakingly analyzed footprints in the desert over a two-month
period189 to determine that “groups of from 8 to 20 persons had walked
north from the Mexican border, across 30 miles of desert and mountains,
over a fairly well-defined path.”190 Officers, studying a particular shoeprint
that “bore a distinctive and repetitive V-shaped or chevron design,” were
able to deduce that the person wearing the shoe that made this print was
leading the groups across the border.191 Analysis of the tracks of this leader,
whom the officials named “Chevron,” indicated he travelled at night
(because the obstacles the groups encountered would have been avoided in

185. For an example of a particularly egregious case of local law enforcement coercing
confessions, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
186. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
187. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488–89 (1964) (emphasis added). See also
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 181 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418–419 (1981).
189. Id. at 419.
190. Id. at 413.
191. Id.
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daylight), around weekends, and when the weather was clear.192 Officers
further studied the patterns of the tracks to determine the location where the
group would be picked up by a vehicle and the direction the vehicle would
move when it was meeting the group.193 Border patrol agents narrowed the
time of pick up to a five-hour window and even determined the size of the
vehicle for which they were looking (a pick up large enough to hold 8 to 20
people).194 Finally, the officers did not pull over the vehicle immediately
upon spotting it, but waited to ensure that its driving behavior (returning in
an hour and a half and driving in the opposite direction) conformed to the
suspected criminal activity.195 In the wake of Navarette, agents at the border
might be tempted to dispense with such drudgery, instead asking the public
to call in tips, even if anonymous, that could be carried out based on little
more than a description of a vehicle’s appearance and location. This logic
of course can be extended to officers accosting people on the sidewalk and
highway patrol agents stopping drivers suspected of being under the
influence.
The phrases “reasonable suspicion,” “totality of the circumstances,”
and “objective basis” are powerless abstractions. Such rules are “given
meaning only through (their) application to the particular circumstances of
a case.”196 Navarette’s chief failing occurred during the crucial task of
giving content to these rules through actual application. The Court invoked
all the right words, speaking of “a particularized and objective basis” for
suspecting criminal activity, noting that reasonable suspicion “is dependent
upon both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree
of reliability,” and intoning that “[t]hese principles apply with full force to
investigative stops based on information from anonymous tips.”197
Navarette, however, drained the authority out of these rules by finding them
satisfied by a nameless caller who offered little more than an accusation and
a description of a truck’s appearance and place.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 413 (1981).
Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687–88 (2014).
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V. Conclusion

In The Lord of the Flies, William Golding’s novel about young boys
marooned on an island in the tropics, one boy, Jack, paints his face with
clay before hunting a wild pig.198 The “mask was a thing on its own, behind
which Jack hid, liberated from shame and self-consciousness.”199 The
freedom provided by altering or hiding his identity contributed to Jack’s
ability to commit act of violence—killing the pig.200 Philip Zimbardo,
professor emeritus at Stanford University, has recognized the dramatic
psychological consequences of anonymity, warning, “anything, or any
situation, that makes people feel anonymous, as though no one knows who
they are or cares to know, reduces their sense of personal accountability,
thereby creating the potential for evil action.”201 The negative consequences
of anonymity have endangered our roadways. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration has reported that road rage is due in part to
the “anonymity provided by motor vehicles.”202 The Automobile Club’s
research has discovered that over a period of seven years, road rage
“resulted in at least 218 murders and another 12,610 injury cases.”203 If the
sense of unaccountability that flows from anonymity can contribute to
drivers’ decisions to attempt murder, it seems quite possible that, among the
thousands of motorists who are aggravated by the perceived incompetence
or rudeness of other drivers, many could choose to call police with invented
stories of reckless driving or worse. There is a curious irony that the
Navarette decision now empowers informants acting under the cloak of
anonymity to combat dangerous driving, a behavior emboldened by
anonymity’s unaccountability in the first place.
In diluting reasonable suspicion by empowering the anonymous,
Navarette exploited a weakness in stop and frisk law present from its
inception. As previously seen, Terry allowed police to seize persons on a
198. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES 67–68 (Riverhead Books 1997).
199. Id. at 68–69.
200. Id. at 74.
201. PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE
TURN EVIL 301 (Random House Trade Paperbacks, reprint ed., 2008). Zimbardo himself
made the connection to Lord of the Flies, finding William Golding’s insight about
“anonymity and aggression” to be “psychologically valid.” Id. Zimbardo also noted, “any
setting that cloaks people in anonymity reduces their sense of personal accountability and
civic responsibility for their actions.” Id. at 25.
202. See JACK STUSTER, AGGRESSIVE DRIVING ENFORCEMENT: EVALUATION OF TWO
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS (2004).
203. Supra note 164.
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level of certainty less than probable cause, a standard having “roots that are
deep in our history”204 and previously understood to be “the best
compromise that has been found for accommodating . . . often opposing
interests.”205 When it did so, Terry acted without textual backing from the
Fourth Amendment, thus creating a rule that was vulnerable to erosion. The
elaborate framework Terry constructed to limit police powers of stop and
frisk began to crumble only four years later, when, in Adams, the Court
allowed an officer to both rely on another person’s observations and to
search beneath the “outer clothing”206 by recovering a gun from a suspect’s
waistband.207 Stop and frisk’s “totality of the circumstances” analysis, as
explained in White, placed even more emphasis on the actual application
portion of Terry litigation.208 Reasonable suspicion thus “acquired content
only through application.”209 This context made Navarette’s application of
the reasonable suspicion standard to anonymous informants uniquely
potent.
Navarette employed this power to limit Fourth Amendment
protections still further by enabling police to stop cars on the roadway
based on nothing more than an unknown stranger’s description of a car, its
location, and a bald accusation. Justice Scalia, in noting that the Court
purported to adhere to prior Fourth Amendment cases, warned: “Be not
deceived.”210 In shrugging off concerns about tips from anonymous
informants, Navarette failed to appreciate its weakening of the right to be
free of unreasonable seizures, the right, in short, “to be let alone.”211 In
easing police officers’ burdens in establishing reasonable suspicion, the
Court missed a fundamental point: “the forefathers, after consulting the
lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way
of a too permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a
greater danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from
punishment.”212 The Court, while complacently exalting general Fourth
204. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
205. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91(1964).
206. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
207. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 149 (1972).
208. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).
209. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
210. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. “The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the government, the
right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
212. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
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Amendment principles, failed to preserve our rights when it came down to
dealing with the details.

